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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONDEMNATION:
UNDERLYING EMOTIONS AND THEIR SYMBOLIC
EXPRESSION IN CONDEMNING AND SHAMING*
Sharon Lambt
It is not so difficult for the general public, along with
many a philosopher, to distinguish between judging and
condemning. Roger Wertheimer reminds us that abstaining
from judgment is not an option for human beings.1 While
lawyers, philosophers and psychologists alike would agree that
the cognitive act of judging is integral to moral practice in any
culture, condemning, its emotional sister, may be even more
profoundly connected to morality. Judgments are anchored by
social standards of behavior, which may shift by way of
changes in time and differences in place. In contrast,
condemnation is more unpredictable and less controllable,
stemming as easily from an emotional impulse as from an
awareness that someone has violated an important social
norm.
Dan Kahan argues that emotional impulse always
underlies judging and we fool ourselves to think otherwise.2 He
suggests that an affect-laden perception arrives on the scene
before cognition kicks in and that all subsequent doctrine
conforms to it. He even goes so far as to argue that the law
cannot be based on anything else; it will always be reduced to
these primal reactions.3 In an earlier essay, Kahan went
further to argue that an emotional impulse such as disgust
© 2003 Sharon Lamb. All Rights Reserved.
Professor of Psychology, Saint Michael's College, Colchester, VT 05439.
See Roger Wertheimer, Constraining Condemning, 108 ETHICS 489 (1998).
2 Dan Kahan, The Aesthetics of Blame in Criminal Law, Remarks at the
Brooklyn Law School Center for the Study of Law, Language & Cognition Symposium,
Responsibility & Blame: Psychological & Legal Perspectives (Oct. 18, 2002)
[hereinafter Kahan Remarks].
' See id.
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might be an important basis for legal judgments.4 However,
other scholars, like Martha Nussbaum and Toni Massaro, write
on the danger of using emotional impulses, such as disgust, as
the basis for legal judgments.' All agree that the emotion of
disgust may be a prime motivator, sometimes appropriate and
sometimes not, of condemnation.
This Article examines fear, one of the so-called
"universal" emotions, that may underlie more advanced
emotions such as guilt, shame and disgust. I use the word
"advanced" as a developmental psychologist does, although
there are evolutionary implications therein. Fear is an emotion
that is present very early on in life and is identifiable in most
cultures.' Guilt, shame and disgust, the moral emotions,
appear after the second year of life when an awareness of
standards emerges
In this Article, I discuss the emotions underlying
condemnation from a psychological perspective and go on to
look at a particular kind of fear as a root cause of
condemnation. In the first Section, I examine the need to
express condemnation for certain events from both a social
psychology perspective as well as an individual psychology
perspective. Section II explores the emotion fear as it underlies
4 See Dan H. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 594 (1996) [hereinafter Alternative Sanctions]. See also Dan Kahan, The
Progressive Appropriation of Disgust, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 63 (Susan A. Bandes
ed., 1999).
See Martha C. Nussbaum, Secret Sewers of Vice, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW,
supra note 4, at 19; Toni Massaro, Show (Some) Emotion, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW,
supra note 4, at 80.
6 Emotion theorists who do cross-cultural work seem to agree that fear is
universal. Even cultural constructionists would argue that a variant of fear is present
in all cultures even though the source of that fear would vary. See DYLAN EVANS,
EMOTION: THE SCIENCE OF SENTIMENT 1-17 (2001) and RANDOLPH R. CORNELIUS, THE
SCIENCE OF EMOTION: RESEARCH AND TRADITION IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTIONS 35-
36, 189-92 (1996) for general overviews of the research on the universality of certain
emotions.
7 The emergence of an awareness of standards in the second year of life has
been observed by Jerome Kagan in THE SECOND YEAR: THE EMERGENCE OF SELF-
AWARENESS (1981) and Sharon Lamb in First Moral Sense: An Examination of the
Appearance of Morally Related Behaviors in the Second Year of Life, 22 J. MORAL
EDUC. 97 (1993). See also Deborah Stipek et al., Self-evaluation in Young Children, in
MONOGRAPHS OF THE SOCIETY FOR RESEARCH IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 57 (1992).
Facial expressions and behaviors presumed to reflect shame and guilt have been shown
to appear in the third year of life. See MICHAEL LEWIS, SHAME: THE EXPOSED SELF
(1992); Karen C. Barrett et al., Avoiders versus Amenders: Implications for the
Investigation of Guilt and Shame During Toddlerhood?, 7 COGNITION & EMOTION 481
(1993). For a discussion of the development of disgust, see WILLIAM I. MILLER, THE
ANATOMY OF DISGUST 12 (1997).
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the urge to condemn and is expressed in a disguised form,
dressed in indignation. Having explored the relationship of fear
to condemnation in both criminal and tort cases and. its roots in
early childhood, I go on to examine the parenting function of
the law in addressing those fears. Thus, drawing on research
on effective parenting and using parenting as a model judicial
system, Section III explores how society can address the fear
that underlies over-reaching condemnation. Section IV looks at
shaming sanctions through the lens of parenting and discusses
alternate condemning practices that may be more effective, not
only in terms of deterrence, but in terms of the moral
development of individuals. This Article concludes in Section V
that the law, as a collective expression of cultural values, must
establish moral standards to balance its condemnatory
function, a function which, alone, fails to address our societal
ideals.
I. THE NEED TO EXPRESS CONDEMNATION FOR CERTAIN
TRANSGRESSIONS
Condemnation would not be such a controversial and
institutionalized practice if it didn't meet the needs of a culture
on a variety of levels. Condemnation can serve social needs,
personal needs and unconscious needs. Below I describe the
kinds of needs that condemnation satisfies, enabling an
examination, in the next Section, of the function of
condemnation in addressing primitive and early fears that are
aroused when those around us transgress certain social norms.
A. The Social Need to Express Condemnation
Condemnation serves a social function, communicating
to members of society that we don't do that (whatever the
transgression might be)-that we abhor that act, that way of
thinking and that lack of feeling that may have led to the
transgression! The law provides boundaries around behavior
serving as "a continuous, repetitive set of instructions as to
how we should think about good and evil, normal and
pathological, legitimate and illegitimate, order and disorder."9
See Jennifer Robbennolt et al., Symbolism and Incommensurability in
Civil Sanctioning: Decision Makers as Goal Managers, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1130-
38 (2003).
9 David Garland, Punishment and Culture: The Symbolic Dimension of
20031
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The expression of condemnation binds people in a society
together in common feeling when a boundary has been crossed.
In its communicative function, condemnation also
makes a claim to objectivity and impersonality." While
vengeance and vindictiveness are more personal responses,
sometimes rightfully felt as a response to a violation of our
rights,' sometimes serving baser goals, condemnation has an
air of objectivity. We condemn, or we like to believe we
condemn, on behalf of some larger moral principle.
Condemnation can also be assaultive." Through
condemning a wrongdoer, we may want to see him or her
squirm or show some other sign of suffering. This also may
serve a social and communicative function in that public
displays of suffering can offer a form of deterrence to would-be
transgressors and can solidify community through an
expression of a boundary: "These acts will not be tolerated."
The assaultive potential of condemnation suggests an
important distinction that is frequently blurred in the process
of condemning and punishing, that there is a difference
between condemning the act and condemning the agent.
Although the law addresses acts, information about intent and
character is frequently a part of indicting, trying and
sentencing a criminal. Separating the act from the self is
harder to achieve than one might guess, and while the intent
may be to focus on a specific act, moral outrage is more easily
expressed to an individual."
Another function of condemnation is its service in a
culture that has an ambivalent relation to the emotion of
anger. Condemnation gives authoritative approval to the
expression of anger, vindictive feelings and moral superiority
in certain circumstances where, for the most part, such
feelings, in ordinary social relations, are often kept under
wraps. Indeed, Carol Tavris's point that the expression of anger
Criminal Justice, 11 STUDIES L. POL. & SOC'Y 95 (1991).
l' See Wertheimer, supra note 1, at 499.
" Jeffrie G. Murphy, Two Cheers for Vindictiveness, 2 PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y
131, 133-35 (2000).
12 Wertheimer, supra note 1, at 493.
13 See Michael Corrado, Notes on the Structure of a Theory of Excuses, 82 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 465 (1992) (discussing character theory and how, in excuse-
making, the perpetrator sets his self apart from his act). See also Jeffrie G. Murphy,
Forgiveness and Resentment, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 14, 24 (Jeffrie G. Murphy &
Jean Hampton eds., 1988) (reminding us of St. Augustine's injunction to "hate the sin
but not the sinner").
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is more acceptable for those in power, than for those not in
power, 4 implies that condemnation may serve the "little guy"
by democratically allowing all of us, at some time or another, to
feel superior and express justified anger. While this may seem
like a personal benefit, it is still a social one. In a democratic
society replete with hierarchies and deep class and racial
inequities, the opportunity to condemn someone lower than
oneself relieves the tension of racial and class differences.
Finally, Jennifer Robbennolt, John M. Darley and
Robert J. MacCoun argue that condemnation arises when there
has been an incursion onto a community's sacred values. 5
Moral outrage and punitiveness are the response to such
incursions, followed by attempts to cleanse the community by
distancing oneself from the offender and the offense. 6 Sacred
values, however, are not only products of community
consensus; they also hold deep, personal meaning for
individuals. Otherwise it would be difficult to arouse the
requisite emotion necessary to condemn. Sacred values are
sacred because they reflect our ideas of the moral worth of
individuals and the importance of certain relationships.
Feelings about our worth as individuals and about what we can
and should expect from other people are grounded not only in
social practices but in individual development within the
culture.
B. The Personal Need to Express Condemnation
Before addressing the individual or personal need to
condemn, it is important to understand why the law should
consider an individual's personal need to condemn. After all,
isn't the law a social mechanism meant to rise above the selfish
or idiosyncratic impulses of the individual? There are, however,
two reasons for the law to take into consideration the
individual's need to condemn. The first takes the meaning of
individual needs quite literally and suggests that such
individual needs can interfere with the social goals of equity
and objectivity in the court. This might occur through, for
14 See CAROL TAVRIS, ANGER: THE MISUNDERSTOOD EMOTION 198 (1982).
15 Robbennolt et al., supra note 8, at 1133-34.
16 This theory is laid out in Robbennolt et al., supra note 8; however, this
work derives from Philip Tetlock et al., The Psychology of the Unthinkable: Taboo
Trade-Offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals, 78 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 853, 853-56 (2000).
2003]
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example, individual jurors, who introduce their own
idiosyncratic concerns in the guise of social concerns in jury
deliberation, and judges whose emotional impulses and
personal histories may lead to statements or sentences that
express condemnation in ways that go beyond the law. 7
The second reason takes the meaning of individual
needs to mean "human" needs, needs that each of us most
likely harbors based on similar experiences in our culture of
having once been infants, having once been parented and
having been brought into the culture by shared socialization
practices, the meanings of which we share. For instance, we all
have dependency needs, some more than others, and these
needs are deeply human, formed and shaped early on, through
our own histories with our parents and through the cultural
practices that influenced their caregiving.'" The urge to please
important others whom we admire is another example of a
human need. Our individual experiences of being parented as
well as the cultural rules that define the relations between
children and adults influence how we express these needs.
C. The Unconscious Need to Express Condemnation
Thus, in discussing the relationship between
individually felt human needs and their relation to the law, it
may be useful to return to the psychoanalytic concept of
unconscious needs and impulses. According to object relations
" See Laura E. Little, Adjudication and Emotion, 3 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 205
(2002) (discussing emotions such as disgust and hate as motivators of judges'
decisions).
18 In this latter meaning of individual needs, the individual is not separate
from the social, which is, of course, a false distinction. Note that I am careful to
describe a cultural basis for these shared human impulses along the lines of Richard
Shweder and Robert Levine expressed in CULTURE THEORY: ESSAYS ON MIND, SELF,
AND EMOTION (1984); Anna Wierzbicka, Emotion, Language, and Cultural Scripts, in
EMOTION AND CULTURE: EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF MUTUAL INFLUENCE 138 (Shinobu
Kitayama & Hazel Rose Markus eds., 1994); CATHERINE A. LUTz, UNNATURAL
EMOTIONS: EVERYDAY SENTIMENTS ON A MICRONESIAN ATOLL & THEIR CHALLENGE TO
WESTERN THEORY (1988); and JAMES R. AVERILL, ANGER AND AGGRESSION: AN ESSAY
ON EMOTION (1982), anthropologists and social constructionists, for example, all of
whom believe that even our basest impulses are shaped socially. This position does not
discount evolutionary theory in total, but argues that whatever capacities that come to
us via evolution or biology quickly are shaped through the culture via various cultural
practices.
It may be helpful also to look at the growing literature on therapeutic
jurisprudence for a discussion of the hoped for results when the law takes into
consideration the psychology of individuals, at least within the lawyer-client
relationship. See PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING
PROFESSION (Dennis P. Stolle et al. eds., 2000).
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theory, human needs are based on early experiences and,
though common to all, are shaped through individualized social
experiences, the earliest of which are with one's parents.' 9
Those who discuss the expressive function of
punishment 20 seem to focus primarily on what punishments
express to society, although within the last decade the
therapeutic jurisprudence movement began focusing on what
the law and lawyers express to clients in symbolic and
unconscious ways.2' When examining the human emotions
underlying punishment, scholars often take disgust, hatred
and the desire for revenge at face value instead of seeking out
other hidden emotions these expressed emotions might be
serving. Jeffrie Murphy is savvy enough to note, in his article
on shame, that "shame creeps through guilt and feels like
retribution," suggesting complex and buried emotions
underlying the urge to condemn.2 His writing is consistent
with a psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious that puts forth
a sort of hierarchical or layered approach to emotions wherein
some emotions are more straightforward, on the surface, while
others lie beneath. This idea of surface versus hidden emotion
is central to psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious where
emotions can be viewed as censored or acceptable, unconscious
or conscious.
Object relations theory is an outgrowth of Freudian psychoanalytic theory.
Although it shares with Freudian theory the principle of unconscious motivation,
rather than placing sexual and aggressive impulses at the foundation of unconscious
motivation, object relations theory places early feelings in relation to mothering (and
sometimes parenting) as the basis of motivation. Object relations theorists include
MELANIE KLEIN & JOAN RIVIERE, LOVE, HATE, AND REPARATION (1964). For several
essays see also DONALD W. WINNICOTT, THE MATURATIONAL PROCESS AND THE
FACILITATING ENVIRONMENT (1965); and W.R.D. FAIRBAIRN, OBJECT RELATIONS
THEORY OF THE PERSONALITY (1954), all of whom differ in terms of what aspects of the
early relationship are important, how psychic structures are formed based on these
early relationships and to what extent abnormalities derive from normal versus
defective parenting; however, these differences are not important for the purposes of
this Article.
20 Kahan Remarks, supra note 2; Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY, supra note 13, at 111; JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY (1970).
21 See supra note 8; see also Symposium, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
Preventive Law: Transforming Legal Practice and Education, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY &
L. 795 (1999); Gary Melton, Therapy Through Law, 39 CONTEMP. PSYCHOL. 215 (1994).
22 Jeffrie G. Murphy, Shame Creeps Through Guilt and Feels Like
Retribution, 18 LAW & PHIL. 327,342 (1999).
" Nietzsche is well known for his "psychoanalytic" view of the urge to
condemn: namely, that it came from a combination of resentment, spite, malice and
envy. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Moral Epistemology, the Retributive Emotions, and the
"Clumsy Moral Philosophy" of Jesus Christ, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 4, at
2003]
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Current studies of emotion often run up against the
problem of studying emotions one by one; more typically,
emotions are experienced simultaneously with other emotions.
Those researchers who work with physiological measures have
discovered that it is very difficult to identify discrete
physiological responses for each emotion. 4 Moreover, social
constructionists would argue that the boundaries around
emotions, how we define an emotion and differentiate it from
others, are a matter of cultural practice." Still, psychoanalytic
theory can be brought to bear on this problem of multiple
emotions for, in layering emotions, the theory implies that
more than one emotion is experienced at one time and that the
more important emotion is the underlying one. Additionally,
the psychoanalytic concept of ambivalence holds that people
can, and often do, feel more than one way at the same time.
Roger Wertheimer claims that we as a culture are deeply
ambivalent about our urge to condemn." The law, however,
understandably does not like ambivalence because it is so
difficult to state and enforce standards about which we feel
ambivalent. Still, unconscious needs are often ambivalent and
conflicting. Moreover, those needs that we keep from
awareness are often in conflict with what we express.27
Taking that bit of psychoanalytic theory as truth: What
is the hidden side of condemnation? Where is the ambivalence?
What is the unacceptable feeling? As Freud urged us to look at
extreme cases to understand the psyche,28 we can perhaps gain
insight through examining the most extreme cases of
condemnation, e.g., "runaway juries" who award exorbitant
amounts to consumer plaintiffs or judges who, wrongly
believing all sex offenders are incurable, throw the book at a
"monster" of a man. In both of these cases disgust may be
154-55 (discussing Nietzsche's views on self-deception and cruelty as the basis of
retribution).
24 See CORNELIUS, supra note 6.
25 For an excellent overview, see id.
26 Wertheimer, supra note 1, at 490.
27 This is a core understanding of psychoanalytic theory, that expressed
emotion may not represent felt emotion and the individual might still be unaware of
the felt emotion.
2' Here I refer to Freud's famous metaphor of the psyche as a piece of crystal.
When thrown to the floor, it breaks "not into haphazard pieces [but] comes apart along
its lines of cleavage into fragments whose boundaries, though they were invisible, were
predetermined by the crystal's structure." XXXI SIGMUND FREUD, Dissection of the
Personality, in NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND OTHER
WORKS 59 (James Strachey et al. eds. & trans., 1964).
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present, but I argue that fear is the underlying emotion behind
these condemnations. Before discussing the fear that underlies
condemnation, however, it is important to examine the anger
and outrage that seem more obviously to fuel the judgment.
Were we to ask those who condemn what they actually
were feeling in the moment of condemnation, they would most
likely describe anger and outrage, maybe even indignation, but
not fear. In Western society, anger and outrage are more
acceptable emotions to individuals than fear because as one
experiences anger and outrage, and one has the option to act on
these feelings, one often feels powerful. For Westerners, anger
and outrage are associated with strength rather than
weakness; but this is not true in all Western cultures. Linguist
Anna Wierzbicka tells us that the Polish have a word for anger,
zlosc, which connotes weakness-immaturity, lack of restraint,
almost a childish rage.29 But in the United States, one need
only look at the last few decades worth of Schwarzenegger
movies to understand that anger is action. It is force. While
social constructionists argue that we feel anger as
overwhelming us, as a passion that allows us to act on our
anger without taking responsibility for the damage we might
inflict, this does not contradict the authority, superiority and
strength that anger affords us. As Carol Tavris and James
Averill have each argued, those who are in a superior position
in any hierarchy are given permission (and give themselves
permission) to "lose control" and get angry, thus expressing
superiority and authority as well as strength through anger."
In experiencing anger, we rarely feel like "the victim." In fact,
therapy with victims frequently involves getting in touch with
one's anger as a form of self-empowerment."
Fear, on the other hand, is, well, it's frightening. Why?
Because it is so difficult to sit with it. When jurors feel afraid,
they feel vulnerable and too much like the victim who was
harmed by the offender. While we certainly go through rituals
to distance ourselves from wrongdoers,32 we also go through
29 See Wierzbicka, supra note 18.
31 See James R. Averill, Anger, in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM OF MOTIVATION 1
(R.A. Dienstbier ed., 1978); TAVRIS, supra note 14.
31 See BONNIE BURSTOW, RADICAL FEMINIST THERAPY: WORKING IN THE
CONTEXT OF VIOLENCE (1992) for a scholarly discussion. For a more popular approach
to working with victims, see ELLEN BASS & LAURA DAVIS, THE COURAGE TO HEAL: A
GUIDE FOR WOMEN SURVIVORS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (3d ed. 1994).
32 Tetlock et al., supra note 16; Wertheimer, supra note 1; SHARON LAMB,
THE TROUBLE WITH BLAME: VICTIMS, PERPETRATORS, AND RESPONSIBILITY (1996);
20031
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rituals to distance ourselves from victims.3 Distancing is
similar to the "flee" response, well known to be a response to
fear, its psychological parallel.
Fear can have an internal as well as an external basis.
Cognitive theorists might argue that all fear is based on
internal factors, one's attributions and assessments of what is
fearful and how fearful a person or event actually is.34 However,
by internal I mean to refer to an internal source-fears about
one's self, one's emotions, one's potential for action. This view
of internal fears stems from a psychoanalytic understanding of
the unconscious. For example, an internal fear may be that one
cannot control one's anger, that it would destroy other people if
one expressed it. In contrast, external fears are those fears
based on the perception of actual threat to the self. An external
fear would be about others' anger destroying you. Of course, an
external fear can be real, but it can also be based wholly or in
part on a defense against the internal fear. I want to make
clear from the outset that although I am focusing on these
internal fears, projected outward, I take seriously the actual
fear that wrongdoing in our world evokes in all of us, even
when more primitive fears may influence the understanding
and experiencing of that fear (caused by the horrors or
indifference of the external world).
The primitive fears to which I refer relate to safety,
security and our utter helplessness as infants when we enter
the world. Fear is one such "primitive" emotion, not only
because it is one of the "basic" emotions identified by
evolutionary and emotion theorists,35 but because it is an early
emotion upon which social relations are built. A parent's ability
to soothe fears and provide a secure space for the infant and
child to develop is fundamental to healthy development. 6
Collin O'Connor Udell, Parading the Saurian Tail: Projection, Jung, and the Law, 42
ARIZ. L. REV. 731, 751-53 (2000).
33 LAMB, supra note 32.
34 For a discussion of cognitive views of fear, see CORNELIUS, supra note 6.
31 See Paul Ekman & W. V. Friesen, Constants Across Cultures in the Face
and Emotion, 17 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 124-29 (1971); Carroll Izard, Innate
and Universal Facial Expressions: Evidence from Developmental and Cross-Cultural
Research, 115 PSYCHOL. BULL. 288-99; ROBERT PLUTCHIK, EMOTION: A
PSYCHOEVOLUTIONARY SYNTHESIS (1980). But saying that fear is basic doesn't mean
it's the same in all cultures. Ekman and Friesen found that the Fore tribe in New
Guinea and Western college students were least likely to agree on what constituted a
"fearful" expression.
36 This is a basic tenet of both the object relations theories and interpersonal
theories that came out of traditional Freudian psychoanalytic theory, developed in the
[Vol. 68:4
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This primitive emotion, fear, is dressed up to make it
acceptable in two important ways. First, the individual psyche
transforms less acceptable emotions into more acceptable or
empowering ones, e.g., fear into anger. Second, we use the
defense of projective identification, denying parts of ourselves
and finding unconscious ways to make others live out these
feelings for us. 7 Joan Riviere, an object relations theorist,
wrote of projection:
The first and the most fundamental of our insurances or safety-
measures against feelings of pain, or being attacked, or of
helplessness-from which so many others spring-is that device we
call projection. All painful and unpleasant sensations or feelings in
the mind are by this device automatically relegated outside oneself;
one assumes that they belong elsewhere, not in oneself.
3 s
Projective identification moves one step beyond projection by
involving another in our fantasy, by in effect inducing another
to play a role that satisfies our own disowned emotions. When
we feel fear, through projective identification, we find a way to
make someone else afraid so that we no longer have to own and
experience that uncomfortable emotion. Condemnation serves
this function by allowing us to deny our own fears, making
those condemned quake at their punishment.
II. FEAR AS AN INTERNAL MOTIVATOR FOR CONDEMNATION
OF CRIMINALS
W. Ian Miller writes that fear is "the passion which
underwrites all coercive law."39 Because of fear, protection is
one of the primary goals of the law and punishment. How,
1930s through 1960s. See HARRY STACK, SULLIVAN, THE INTERPERSONAL THEORY OF
PSYCHIATRY (1953) (discussing the security dynamism of the infant); ERIK ERIKSON,
Eight Ages of Man, in CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (1950) (discussing "basic trust").
W.R.D. Fairbairn, D.W. Winnicott and other object relations theorists assert that good
enough mothering is essential to children's healthy development. See, e.g., DONALD W.
WINNICOTT, Ego Distortion in Terms of True and False Self, in MATURATIONAL
PROCESSES AND THE FACILITATING ENVIRONMENT (1960). See also the developmental
research on an infant's need for a strong attachment in the work of 1 JOHN BOWLBY,
ATTACHMENT AND LOSS (1969) and an earlier study by Rene Spitz, Hospitalism: An
Inquiry Into the Genesis of Psychiatric Conditions in Early Childhood, 1 PSYCHOANAL.
STUD. CHILD 53 (1945).
37 Projective identification was first introduced to psychoanalytic theory by
Melanie Klein. MELANIE KLEIN, THE PSYCHOANALYSIS OF CHILDREN (1932).
38 JOAN RIVIERE, Hate, Greed, and Aggression, in LOVE, HATE, AND
REPARATION, supra note 19.
39 William Ian Miller, Fear, Weak Legs, and Running Away: A Soldier's Story,
in THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 4, at 243.
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then, does condemnation express that people in society are safe
and need not fear? We have seen already how condemnation
expresses moral outrage and confirms shared beliefs about
what kinds of acts are terribly wrong, and how we use
condemnation as a defense against fear, functioning as a show
of force.4° In such cases, to condemn says: "We are not afraid."
One who condemns confronts, and confronts with legitimized
authority; thus, condemnation transforms fear into strength.
Illustrating how fear motivates society's condemnation
of murderers and rapists may be useful before moving on to
more subtle cases involving negligence, especially cases of
incommensurability, which I examine below. Finally, cases
where motherhood is explicitly involved may be quintessential
cases that evoke a certain kind of fear, which is dealt with
more readily through condemnation.
It is easiest to see the fear beneath condemnation in
criminal cases. Take, for example, the recent sniper shootings
in the Washington, D.C. area. The community's fear, publicized
and addressed in police broadcasts to the community, was
palpable for the rest of the country as we watched the hunt for
the snipers play out on television. The fear was great and the
public condemnation of the shooters even greater,41 even
though one was a seventeen-year-old boy.
Fear is also aroused in sex offense cases, particularly
those involving child sex offenders. These criminals, more
frequently men than women, are usually treated publicly as if
they were monsters,42 although, in fact, they are a very diverse
group. But while fear is somewhat present, anger and disgust
are more salient. In the promotion of Megan's Laws around the
country, the media and legislatures continue to portray the sex
offender as the worst of the worst, incurable, insatiable, unable
to exercise simple restraint and untreatable by medication or
psychotherapy. Thus, the community must be notified of the
40 See supra notes 8-11.
41 One USA Today poll showed over 50% of those in the Washington D.C.
area had a "great deal of anxiety" over sniper shootings as well as terrorist attacks.
Rick Hampson, Nation Pulled Into Sniper's Widening Circle of Fear, USA TODAY, Oct.
24, 2002, at A3. It was interesting to see the anger played out after the snipers were
caught; states jockeyed for prosecutorial position to ensure that they were tried in a
state that would permit execution as retribution. See Shopping For Death, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 13, 2002, at B6.
42 See Mark Donald, Hello My Name Is Pervert, DALLAS OBSERVER, Jan. 11,
2001, available at http://www.dallasobserver.com/issues/2001-01-11/feature.html/page-
1.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2003). For a scholarly treatment, see Udell, supra note 32.
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offender's presence. Such notification, while it may ease fears
within a community, often creates a danger for a recently
released sex offender, who is then the target of outrage and
disgust."
Of course we fear victimization-if not our own, then
that of our children, and particularly our daughters, wives and
sisters. Yet, the law has not historically been strong in its
protection of the victims of sexual violence, which leads us to
ask what other fears such harsh laws and media condemnation
might address? My thought is that this condemnation reflects
our culture's deep ambivalence about sexuality. We choose all
forms of arousing entertainment, accept the commercialization
of sexiness and support the sexualization of youth through the
media; but we remain rather puritanical when it comes to the
sexual impulses of youth and ourselves." Sex offenders thus
evoke a fear of our own sexuality, a fear that it will spiral out of
control or that it can be disgusting and ill-placed. In over-
punishing sex offenders, in creating monsters, we differentiate
us from them and ease our self-conscious fears about our own
sexuality.45 More importantly, by turning them into monsters,
we separate them from the people we know and love, fathers,
stepfathers, uncles and cousins who are much more likely to be
the sexual offenders in the lives of little boys, girls and women.
The real fear is that someone like a father, someone who was
meant to protect children, caused harm. When that happens, a
4' See Lois Presser & Elaine Gunnison, Strange Bedfellows: Is Sex Offender
Notification a Form of Community Justice?, CRIME & DELINQ., July 1999, at 299. They
noted that such trouble ranges from threats to the offender from community members,
as cited in Matthew Stadler, Stalking the Predator. N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1995, at A23;
and Joel B. Rudin, Megan's Law: Can It Stop Sexual Predators-and at What Cost to
Constitutional Rights?, 11 WESTLAW CRIM. JUSTICE 1 (1996), to an inability of the state
to place a halfway house among citizens. See Kevin Murphy, State to Build Halfway
House, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Apr. 21, 2001, at 3B. In one unusual community in
Canada, an organization called "Circles of Support and Accountability" was started to
help offenders returned to the communities to find housing and jobs and keep therapy
appointments. Elsewhere, such support for offenders is rare. Tamsen Tillson, Sex
Offenders Find Hope Through Community Support Program, 5 J. ADDICTION &
MENTAL HEALTH 12 (2002).
4' The call for abstinence programs by President George W. Bush, for
example, reflects this puritanical aspect. See also Mark Whitaker, The New Virginity:
No Sex Until Marriage is Gaining Popularity Among Teens, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 9, 2002,
at 5. See JUDITH LEVINE, HARMFUL TO MINORS (2002); SHARON LAMB, THE SECRET
LIVES OF GIRLS: WHAT GOOD GIRLS REALLY Do (2002) (discussing these trends).
45 See LAMB, supra note 32; Sharon Lamb, Constructing the Victim: Popular
Images and Lasting Labels, in NEW VERSIONS OF VICTIMS 108 (1999) [hereinafter
Constructing the Victim].
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primitive fear is aroused that necessitates seeing an offender
as alien, a "loner," not like us, and, therefore, condemnable.
But what of the fear that cases of negligence arouse
when some person or entity fails to take care. Even worse,
what of the fear that cases of incommensurability arouse, when
an institution or company puts a value on our safety or our
lives, taking risks that put us in danger for financial reasons
often based on a cost-benefit analysis. Robbennolt and her
colleagues note that in cases of incommensurability, punitive
damages awards are quite high.4 ' The famous Ford Pinto case
41
seems the prototype of such cases; but more recently, the
unprecedented punitive damages awarded to cigarette smokers
seem to represent an unbounded outrage. In cases of
incommensurability, Robbennolt et al. observe that the
wrongdoer seems quite separated from social norms in that he
or they could put a pricetag on human life."
Robbennolt and associates suggest that the urge to
condemn in these cases goes hand-in-hand with seeing the
wrongdoer as less of a person.' They propose that this may be
an attempt to balance the power scale that such acts of
wrongdoing tip. As in the case of sex offenders, seeing the
wrongdoer as sub-human, as less of a person, may be a way of
seeing the offender as alien, not us, and thus worthy of
condemnation. Seeing a wrongdoer as less of a person, though
ironically an agent still, makes it easier for a jury to impose
exorbitant punitive damages, especially if this is the only
means by which it can act aggressively toward the wrongdoer
and make him suffer.
In cases of incommensurability, Robbennolt and
colleagues argue, juries make a symbolic statement, showing
the world that this kind of thinking or behavior is
unacceptable." The exorbitant awards appear to address jurors'
and the general public's outrage at an impersonal, material
world. But the private is not so separate from the public. The
46 See LAMB supra note 32; Udell supra note 32.
4' Robbennolt et al., supra note 8, at 1138.
" Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
41 See, e.g., Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (D.
Kan. 2002) (awarding one smoker $15 million in punitive damages); Engle v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (returning verdict of $145
billion in punitive damages).
"0 See Robbennolt et al., supra note 8, at 1134-37.
51 Id. at 1139-41.
52 Id. at 1136-37.
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desire to make some person or agency suffer for his inhumanity
or negligence may arise not only from the outrage we
experience knowing that large, impersonal organizations rule
our lives, but also because the wrong act (or wrongful failure to
act) has evoked our earliest and most primitive fear-that we
won't be taken care of, that those in charge of our care can put
their own needs ahead of ours. Clearly the outrage against
negligent organizations is overdetermined, but even the rage
against our feeling that the world is impersonal and dangerous
hearkens back to infancy; the antidote for being treated
impersonally and like a number is being treated as special,
unique and important, which is fundamentally a part of
parent/child love. While the act of condemning makes us feel
strong and superior, money, or at least a verdict in our favor, is
a sign of importance.
The infant who is not treated well rails against the loss
of this basic right to be important."8 Various psychologists and
psychoanalysts call this right a sense of security, safety, basic
trust and an experience of "going on being." The "mother"
serves as the archetypal image of such care, although religion
as a cultural institution also serves this primitive function for
people.54 Our urge to condemn in cases where a mother or
father figure or institution doesn't care, and our urge to make
someone suffer, to get even, speaks of an emotional hurt that
needs soothing.
In cases of incommensurability and, at times, in cases of
negligence, when juries unpredictably award huge punitive
damages they may be making a symbolic expressive statement
of their outrage, but they likely also want to express the more
personal injunction that someone should have "taken care."
Cass Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman and David Schkade note that
punitive damages have a "retributive or expressive function
designed to embody social outrage at the actions of serious
wrongdoers.""5 What seems then to appear "arbitrary" and
"unpredictable" in the doling out of damages may be a result of
such punishments stemming not only from "social outrage" but
also from "private fear." If a government or a company that is
53 See supra note 36.
This, of course, is one of the reasons why the outrage against the Catholic
church runs so deep. The bishop did not protect. He put the church's needs before his
parishioners' needs. ERIKSON, supra note 36.
65 Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on
Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998).
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supposed to nurture and support doesn't, it becomes the target
for our most basic aggressive feelings. It becomes the bad
parent that must be destroyed to restore the pleasant fiction of
a secure world. Fear is about annihilation, and, as Neal
Feigenson has shown us in his discussion of "Terror
Management Theory," the unconscious effort to suppress fear,
measured through making mortality issues more or less
salient, leads people to punish more.56
Condemnation, in the guise of impartiality, serves a
psychic goal of punishing the bad parent who did not keep us
safe. Laws demanding such care from governments and
companies reinforce the profoundly human expectation that
everyone should be cared for. When this expectation is
challenged, when it becomes clear that those who have power
over us may not care or could have put a monetary value to
caring, we are more inclined to see the wrongdoer as less than
human, a projective screen for evil, and to punish severely.
Defense lawyers sense this and do what they can to
make defendants more individual and more human. When a
judge or jury's impulse is to dehumanize the criminal, to make
him part of an institution or a monster of greed, the only way
to counteract this tendency is to re-humanize him. Bringing
defendants' families into the courtroom is an effort to symbolize
that a defendant can take care, that he or she is a caretaker.
The process of making monsters is a process that
addresses underlying fears. Governments and corporations
may be more vulnerable to being cast as monstrous and, as
archetypically male institutions, come to represent the law of
the father, stern and overly critical.57 Whenever a defendant
fits an archetypal image and evokes primal worries about
annihilation, about who counts, and about who will take care of
"me," I suspect juries and judges impose higher damage awards
and stronger sentences. Susan Bandes writes about the
problems of blaming entities rather than agents with "no soul
56 See Neil Feigenson, Emotions, Risk Perceptions and Blaming in 9111
Cases, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 959, 972-73 (2003) for discussion. The reference for the
research is Abram Rosenblatt et al., Evidence for Terror Management Theory: I. The
Effects of Mortality Salience on Reactions to Those Who Violate or Uphold Cultural
Values, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 681 (1989).
" The father has been cast in this role through Freudian theory; Freud wrote
that the Super-Ego, based on identification with the father, was an overly harsh
version of the father based on fear instead of actual personal relations. See FREUD,
supra note 28.
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to be damned, no body to be kicked."58 However, institutions
can be personified and can come to archetypally represent
certain classes of persons about whom we have feelings and
expectations. For example, the Catholic church recently has
taken a beating. While it is satisfying to some to point the
finger at Boston's Cardinal Law and see him step down, the
church itself has lost the trust of many of its parishioners.59
The best the church can do is to ask Catholics to separate their
attitudes toward the wrongdoing priest from their attitudes
toward the church. This would prevent parishioners from
personifying the church as a parent who let them down and
reconfirm their faith in God as the ultimate parent who
provides.
While both institutional representations of mothers and
fathers (like teachers and priests) may evoke equally strong
reactions in us, actual mothers who are negligent or criminal
seem to evoke much more public condemnation or confusion
than actual fathers who do wrong. Because of the need to find
archetypal representations, mothers are often initially
portrayed by prosecutors and the media as monster criminals.
Once again, our deepest fears of not being taken care of,
deeper, I would argue, than disgust or shame, are most directly
evoked when a mother doesn't take care. Mothers who don't
protect their children well enough are blamed for the
aggression perpetrated on their children by their boyfriends.
Recently, in Chicago, Tabitha Pollock, a mother who was
convicted of first degree murder of her daughter seven years
ago was finally acquitted and released after Lawrence Marshall
and associates at The Center for Wrongful Convictions at
Northwestern University Law School took on her case and
convinced the Illinois Supreme Court to overturn her
conviction." What was so interesting about this case was that
Tabitha Pollock's boyfriend, not she, was the murderer, that
Susan A. Bandes, Not Enough to Go Around: Reflections on Requiring
Purposeful Government Conduct, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1195, 1199 (2003).
69 Angie Cannon et al., Catholics in Crisis, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 1,
2002, at 50.
60 All Things Considered, (NPR radio broadcast, Nov. 27, 2002) (discussing
the conviction and acquittal of Tabitha Pollock for the murder of her daughter). See
also Adam Liptak, Judging a Mother for Someone Else's Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27,
2002, at A17. It is interesting that right after the state supreme court overturned the
Pollock decision, another Chicago mother, Linda Kee, was charged with first degree
murder after her boyfriend, who was babysitting, fatally beat her son, Anthony Moore,
while she was at work. See Annie Sweeney, Mom, Boyfriend Held in Child Death, CHI.
SUN TIMES, Nov. 27, 2002, at 11.
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she was asleep when it happened, and that she expressed
significant distress and guilt when she learned from the police
that her boyfriend had murdered her daughter.61
Mothers like Ms. Pollock become sites of great cultural
conflict-not just condemnation, but ambivalence. 6' How could
they not care? Headlines and news stories descriptively point to
callousness for its shock value: Natalia Higier, 47, a Latvian
native, "was more concerned about her dog than her child;"63
and a Scottish newspaper headlined "Mother 'smoked as baby
was battered to death' when Andrea Bone, a young mother,
allegedly "sat on a sofa, smoking a cigarette and drinking a cup
of coffee" as her baby was murdered.64
In spite of such condemnation, very few mothers who
have murdered their children have been put to death save for
Christina Riggs.65 Although she offered an insanity defense,
which is typical of mothers who murder their children, she was
executed by lethal injection in May of 2000.66 In cases like
Susan Smith"7 and Andrea Yates,' media stories focused on
whether and how to hold these women responsible, searching,
perhaps, for that syndrome or sign of insanity that would
explain these horrible acts. The media first portrayed Susan
Smith as getting rid of her children to further a love affair, but
when information about her own childhood abuse was revealed,
the media coverage was more sympathetic. Society came to
view Andrea Yates's murder of her four children as an act of a
61 Liptak, supra note 60, at A17.
62 There was also significant debate over Hedda Nussbaum, the mother who
did little to prevent her adopted daughter, Lisa Steinberg's sexual abuse, beatings and
eventual death in New York in 1987. Nussbaum was present, using drugs with her
boyfriend, Joel Steinberg, when Lisa lay dying near her on the floor. Some saw her as a
victim of "Battered Women's Syndrome." Others reject the incapacitation argument, as
there were numerous incidents in the life of this girl that received little attention. For
more information on Nussbaum and the Steinberg case, see Mark Gabo's The Killing of
Lisa Steinberg at http://www.crimelibrary.comlnotorious murders/family/lisa-stein-
berg/l.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2003).
63 Marie Szaniszlo & David Weber, Mother Nabbed in Tot's Death, BOSTON
HERALD, Aug. 16, 2002, at 1.
64 Frank Urquhart, Mother 'Smoked as Baby was Battered to Death',
SCOTSMAN, Sept. 25, 2002, at 8.
65 David Crary, Beyond the Andrea Yates Case; Outcomes Have Varied
Sharply in Trials of Mothers Who Kill Kids, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 10, 2001.
66 See Emily Yellin, Arkansas Executes a Woman Who Killed Both Her
Children, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2000, at A22.
67 Rick Bragg, Life of a Mother Accused of Killing Offers No Clues, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 1994, at Al.
66 Megan K. Stack, Killings Put Dark Side of Mom's Life in Light, L.A. TIMES,
Jul. 8, 2001, at A20.
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severely depressed and unbalanced person, although, in the
beginning, the media pointed to her Christian fundamentalism
and allegedly authoritarian husband. 9
Are women treated differently from men? In the case of
Tabitha Pollock and other cases like Linda Kee or Andrea
Bone, the mother was charged with the murder of her child
that her boyfriend actually committed," but Andrea Yates's
husband was not held responsible legally for failing to
recognize his wife's depression as potentially dangerous to his
children. Nor was Natalia Higier's husband Louis, who initially
laughed when police questioned him about the child's injuries,
charged.71
Regardless of whether the law treats men and women
differently, we know that female jurors may condemn
differently. Research shows that in negligence cases, female
jurors rated defendants' behavior as more outrageous than
male jurors do.72 Women perceived more punitive intent and
recommended higher punitive awards.73 Moreover, women were
most punitive and most outraged when the defendant was a
woman.74 Are women acting as guardians of maternal care? Do
they act as "honorary" men, keeping women in line with regard
to their mothering role? Or, do they value care more and
condemn it more heartily? Is a woman's refusal to care, that
urge to walk away, more frightening to female jurors? Coming
from a position of dependence, which in many communities still
characterizes financial relations between men and women, is
the refusal to take care even more personally frightening?
Problems of unfairness arise when the law expresses
these deepest and most profound impulses, in a way that
makes condemnation a defense against our fears of our own
impulses as well as our basic insecurities about lack of care.
The treatment of individuals as representatives of larger
institutions, both real and psychological, poses a problem to a
system that prizes autonomy and agency. And the enactment of
rage onto institutions and persons without an examination of
our own fears guarantees overreaction and even, at times, cruel
69 See, e.g., Bonnie Miller Rubin, Texas Mom's Murder Trial Elicits Outrage,
CHI. TRIB., Mar. 7, 2002, at 4.
70 See supra notes 60-64.
71 See Szaniszlo & Weber, supra note 63.
72 Sunstein et al., supra note 55, at 2100.
73 Id.
74 Id.
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punishment. We must examine the way we condemn and the
punishments we inflict that are based on fear. In addition, the
law may benefit from an examination of how other institutions
operate to soothe fears and constrain rageful acting out. I turn
now to the family as one such institution that deals with fear
and examine which practices best produce moral citizens.
III. PARENTING AND THE LAW
Because expressions of condemnation, motivated by fear
and self-preservation, have their roots in family life, parenting
practices can be used to understand how the law might best
soothe certain impulses that underlie our need to condemn. In
its socialization of our youngest moral citizens, the family doles
out punishments and addresses fears and insecurities; the way
parents, or parental figures, take care-the way they judge,
provide support and instill cultural values-forms the
foundation of our moral impulses.
Proposing parenting as a model for the state in relation
to its wrongdoers, though, is risky business. It flies against our
liberal notions of individual autonomy, and it seems to demean
citizens to the level of children, while elevating the state to a
false hierarchical position of parental overseer. This
understanding, however, derives from the fact that parenting is
often construed as only a heteronymous relationship, where the
"law" of the family is handed down in absolute edicts from
adults who are superior in every way to the ones over whom
they rule. We use words like "paternalistic" and "patriarchal"
not only to describe the rule of the father, but also to describe
organizations that depend on hierarchy and prescribe the laws
and to describe systems where the rule maker does not give
due agency to the person or persons under her care."
This may be a distorted or one-sided view of parenting,
for parents can be more than law makers. Elements of
caretaking, for example, which are integral to the problematic
institution we call the family, can counteract coercive and
hierarchical elements.76 These two functions of the family have
7 Indeed, an honest assessment of the family does support a view of it as a
deeply problematic institution. My analysis seeks not to deny it but rather to uncover
other aspects of family life that co-exist with the hierarchical, patriarchal rule that also
is foundational. See CAROL GILLIGAN, THE BIRTH OF PLEASURE (2002).
76 This is a notion set forth by Carol Gilligan in IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1989).
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been historically represented as a gendered split, with the
father representing the rule-enforcing and rule-setting function
while the mother represents the care-taking function. Such a
split is reflected in our legal institutions where the therapeutic
is kept at a distance rather than embedded within the system,
as it has been in periods where rehabilitative ideas are
prominent.77
Parenting, like law, is a system in which those under its
care are brought to understand and eventually internalize the
law. However, over and over again, research and clinical
material suggest that family discipline enforced without love,
guidance and care does not produce children who love the law
and internalize it as their own." Instead, it produces either
empty or fearful do-gooders or rebellious rule breakers.
Research on parenting behaviors has shown that the
"authoritarian parent" or the parent who uses "power
assertion" produces children who are angry and aggressive,79
who fail to internalize moral values" and who do not develop a
coherent sense of conscience.81 Children whose parents use
withdrawal of love to socialize moral behavior may inhibit
misbehavior, comply with rules and show self-control; however,
these children do so to feel less anxious rather than as an
expression of moral standards." In contrast, the authoritative
parent uses firm standards and control, communicated with
warmth and nurturance to produce children who respect and
internalize the law.83 These kinds of parents confront children
with the consequences of their acts and the harm to victims,
71 See Garland supra note 9 about this split between the legal and the
therapeutic.
78 Perhaps this observation prompts Judge Judy Mitchell-Davis to hug and
kiss juvenile wrongdoers in drug treatment court in Chicago. See Adam Lasker, Her
Stock in Trade is "Therapeutic Jurisprudence," CHI. DAILY L. BULL., June 13, 2001, at
3.
" See Leonard D. Eron et al., The Convergence of Laboratory and Field
Studies of the Development of Aggression, in DETERMINANTS AND ORIGINS OF
AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 347-80 (J. de Wit & W. W. Hartup eds., 1974), cited in DANIEL
K. LAPSLEY, MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, at 191 (1996).
"0 See Martin L. Hoffman, Moral Internalization, Parental Power, and the
Nature of Parent-Child Interaction, 11 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 228 (1975).
81 See Grazyna Kochanska, Socialization and Temperament in the
Development of Guilt and Conscience, 62 CHILD DEV. 1379 (1991).
82 See LAPSLEY, supra note 79, at 191.
See Diana Baumrind's original work Current Patterns of Parental
Authority, 4 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS 1 (1971) and more recently The
influence of Parenting Style on Adolescent Competence and Substance Use, 11 J. EARLY
ADOL. 56 (1991). See also L. Steinberg et al., Authoritative Parenting and Adolescent
Adjustment Across Various Ecological Niches, 1 J. RES. ON ADOL. 19 (1991).
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show a commitment to the standards they set by noting them
consistently and communicate generally that it is "good" to
obey legitimate authority.84  Through care, warmth and
nurturance, they convey to the child that he is a worthwhile
human being even though he might have done something
condemnable. The implication is that condemnation alone,
without warmth, won't work with children. When a parent
neither withdraws from the relationship nor indulges his or her
own aggressive impulses, the parent generally produces
children who feel safer in the world and who obey the law not
because it is imposed from above but because it is theirs too-
they understand it.
The goal of parenting vis-A-vis moral values is to hope
for and support increased agency, internalization, self-
regulation and understanding with regard to laws of behavior.
Within the family, shaming techniques and love withdrawal
are the least effective means of fostering internalization of
morality. Children who fear being shamed may avoid wrongful
behavior due to anxiety, but they are unlikely to develop a
relation to the law that is meaningful and makes them a full
citizen to that law. And why? Shaming makes one want to hide;
it doesn't produce pro-social behavior in wrongdoers; it
increases internal fantasies of revenge; and it can provoke the
child to externalize blame and act out. 5 Finally, shaming can
reduce empathy.86
The alternative to shaming is not allowing children to
do as they wish, but rather inducing guilt through relationship
and a strong commitment to standards of behavior. Morris
writes that in a "guilt morality," what is valued is "a
relationship with others . . .With guilt we have a conceptual
scheme of obligations and entitlements (leading to) the idea of
84 LAPSLEY, supra note 79, at 192.
8' See Tamara J. Ferguson & Hedy Stegge, Emotional States and Traits in
Children: The Case of Guilt and Shame, in SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF SHAME, GUILT, EMBARRASSMENT, AND PRIDE 174 (June Price Tangney
& Kurt W. Fischer eds., 1995) (discussing guilt-producing and shame-producing
parenting practices); LEWIS supra note 7 (describing the results of shaming); June
Tanguey, Shamed Into Anger? The Relation of Shame and Guilt to Self-Reported Anger
and Aggression, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 669 (1992) (same). See also
Marlene M. Moretti & E. Tory Higgins, The Development of Self-System Vulnerabilities:
Social and Cognitive Factors in Developmental Psychopathology, in COMPETENCE
CONSIDERED 286 (Robert J. Sternberg & John Kolligian, Jr. eds., 1990).
86 Janice Lindsay-Hartz, Contrasting Experiences of Shame and Guilt, 27 AM.
BEHAV. SCIENTIST 689 (1984).
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owing something to others ... With guilt one's status is intact
but one's relationship to others is affected."87
How do parenting practices relate to our urge to
condemn? Those who socialize through shaming, giving
"deficiency messages," threatening separation and blatantly
shaming the child, arouse fear of abandonment and produce a
fundamental insecurity that can not be relieved because the
only way to please the parent is to change the core self.88 Those
children who have received the kind of parenting that
addresses fundamental fears and insecurities, even when they
do wrong, will need to condemn less. As adults, they will be less
inclined to clamor for protection when the slippery sidewalk or
the sniper arouses early fears, and will be less likely to need to
defend against this panic by seeking aggressive satisfaction in
overly harsh sentencing of criminals or high punitive damage
awards.89
In addition, what we have learned about parenting that
instills internalized moral values suggests that the acting out
of condemnation through shaming techniques, exorbitant
awards or overly harsh sentences does little to promote
rehabilitation. I further suggest that when the law acts on
feelings of condemnation, on its moral outrage, there are
psychological as well as social costs.
IV. SHAMING VS. APOLOGY IN THE COURTS
Dan Kahan argues that shaming penalties
"unambiguously express condemnation and are a feasible
alternative to imprisonment for many offenses." ° He divides
shaming practices into four categories: (1) those that stigmatize
through publicity; (2) those that literally stigmatize; (3) self-
debasement; and (4) contrition. I deal with contrition
separately from the other three and argue that it need not be a
form of shaming.9 Professor Kahan argues that shaming
" See HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 60-62 (1976) (noting that
messages that convey the child is not good enough or that there is something
fundamentally wrong with them).
88 T.R. POTTER-EFRON, SHAME, GUILT, AND ALCOHOLISM: TREATMENT ISSUES
IN CLINICAL PRACTICE (1989).
89 See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of Negligence, 47 NW. U. L.
REV. 855, 856 (discussing our insistence in finding fault when there is none as a way
we "clamor for protection").
90 Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 4, at 594.
91 Id. at 631.
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resonates with the public, and indeed it does.92 It expresses
some of our strongest negative emotions, such as hate, disgust
and moral outrage. But should we look for a punishment that
unambivalently expresses our strongest negative emotions?
To answer that question, we may draw on experiences
with shame in our culture, independent of our family
experiences. American junior and senior high school students
are notorious for shaming practices, especially among boys.9"
Recent work on girls' relationships discusses a more verbal,
class-related form of shaming that occurs.94 While peers shame
girls for not wearing clothing from the right stores, boys will be
shamed for any behavior that appears feminine, for being too
eager in class, for looking weak or for tattling. The
quintessential shaming speech act currently in our culture is to
call a boy a "fag."95  The quintessential shaming act
(memorialized in several teen movies) is to dunk his head in a
toilet while others look on and laugh. This latter example
clearly illustrates Toni Massaro's point that shame is not a
discrete emotion but involves embarrassment, humiliation and
mortification "in porous ways."96 Lest we think that shaming is
nothing more than a sign of immaturity, we should recall that
shaming is also an all too common parenting practice. Yet, as
noted above, researchers and clinicians alike have found that
shaming as a parenting practice produces aggressive or
tortured individuals. 97
In a 1996 article, Kahan cites a 1995 Newsweek poll
indicating that the public is prepared to endorse shaming
penalties with enthusiasm.9 For Kahan, this is one reason
punishments should express appropriate condemnation,
consistent with desert and equality-because they represent
92 Id. at 637.
93 See DAN KINDLON & MICHAEL THOMPSON, RAISING CAIN: PROTECTING THE
EMOTIONAL LIVES OF BoYS (1999).
94 See LYN MIKEL BROWN, GIRLFIGHTING (2003); RACHEL SIMMONS, ODD GIRL
OUT: THE HIDDEN CULTURE OF AGGRESSION IN GIRLS (2002); LAMB, supra note 44.
95 Michael Kimmel, Mars, Venus, of Planet Earth, Speech given at Saint
Michael's College, Colchester, VT (Oct. 2002) (on file with author).
Massaro, supra note 5, at 89. For a complete discussion of shame and the
law, see Toni M. Massaro The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3
PSYCHOL. PUBLIC POLICY & L. 645 (1997).
97 DONALD L. NATHANSON, SHAME AND PRIDE: AFFECT, SEX, AND THE BIRTH
OF THE SELF (1992).
98 Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 4, at 637 (citing Jonathan Alter
& Pat Wingert, The Return of Shame, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 1995, at 21).
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the public's emotional response and desires.99 He describes the
waning of the use of corporal punishment as due to its
inconsistency with democratic principles. Corporal
punishment, it was believed, reflected a monarchical,
hierarchical, master/slave relationship between the law and
the wrongdoer. Kahan writes that "[slhaming penalties are free
of any historical association with slavery or other forms of
inequality,"'0 a very odd conclusion given the longstanding
practice in this country of masters humiliating slaves, straight
men humiliating gay men, and men humiliating women
through unwanted sex acts. Shaming is indeed a practice that
evokes superior/inferior relations, a practice through which (as
any junior high schooler will tell you) "in" groups make "out"
groups feel inferior and unwanted: rejected.
As with the socialization of children, criminals and
other wrongdoers will derive little benefit from wholesale
rejection and the ending of a relationship through shaming
acts. Instead, as in good parenting practices, we want the
relationship between wrongdoer and those he has offended to
be salient. We want wrongdoers, when they have done
something wrong, to feel not only that they have not acted
according to their own standards of behavior but also that they
have somehow hurt us. Jeffrie Murphy makes this point nicely
in his discussion of the story of Adam and Eve as a narrative
that is not only about disobedience to authority but also about
the transforming of the relationship between Adam, Eve and
God.' 0'
While shame is a moral emotion, and it may be good to
feel ashamed for some of the things we have done, producing
shame in another person is a different story. We might assume
that if shame is a good moral reaction to a bad act, then the
induction of shame may be appropriate. But self-produced
shame is different from externally produced shame. It comes
from a feeling that one has done something that is so wrong
one feels embarrassed, humiliated and deeply and profoundly
bad. Self-produced shame reflects a conflict between the kind of
person we are and who we had hoped we were. Shame derived
from external sources is something altogether different, and
perhaps we might find a different word for it. Degradation and
99 Id.
Ioo Id. at 647.
'0' Murphy, supra note 22, at 333-35.
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humiliation are two words Murphy suggests, and these do not
strike at the core of the moral self.
102
In condemning, if we do not aim to degrade and
humiliate, we aim to make the wrongdoer suffer and, perhaps,
to be afraid and to comply with the law out of fear of being
ashamed again. But here is the cost to those who condemn.
When we act on our aggressive impulses and project our own
unwanted fear and insecurity onto others, we will never feel
completely safe. When we brutally punish or condemn others to
produce shame, we raise two unconscious fears-that we too
might be brutally punishable and that the world is very, very
unsafe. Linda Ross Meyer raises this point with regard to
shaming and the moral worth of human beings, arguing that
tying a victim's moral worth to the offender's punishment is
senseless."' This externally produced shame never redresses an
imbalance because one cannot assert the moral worth of one
person by denying the moral worth of another.0 4
In contrast to shaming practice, apology may produce
positive results for the wrongdoer and society. Melanie Klein
found that all infants harbor deep aggressive impulses born of
frustration and noted that adults carry the worry of these
impulses throughout their lives. 10' She suggested that only
through acts of reparation can a soul find relief for those
internal fears.106 Thus, acts of apology, even forced apologies,
seem to me something apart from shaming techniques and
should not be considered a variety of "shaming practice."0 7
While such practices can evoke shame in the apologizer, they
are not generally meant to shame, and thus the distinction
between self-produced shame and externally produced shame
remains intact. Apologies reconnect the wrongdoer to some
party he or she has wronged, if only briefly, whether it is an
individual or society. Apologies assert the wrongdoer's moral
worth because he or she is not rejected but rather is brought
back into however tenuous a relationship.
102 Murphy, supra note 11, at 24-28.
103 Linda Ross Meyer, Forgiveness and Public Trust, 27 FoRDHAM URB. L.J.
1515, 1526 (2002).
104 Id.; James Q. Whitman, What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?,
107 YALE L.J. 1055 (1997).
105 See KLEIN & RIVIERE, supra note 19.
106 Id.
107 Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 4, at 631.
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Apology is distinct from remorse, because the former is
an act rather than a feeling and can be performed devoid of
feeling. However, apology makes remorse possible in a way
that the experiencing of shame may not. Lawrence Voogel,
writing on moral responsibility, claims that blameworthiness
depends on one's capacity to be influenced by the world in the
right way as well as one's capacity for proper sensitivity. When
we make criminals monsters in order to justify acting on moral
outrage and feelings of condemnation, we make them less
blameworthy. When we ask for an apology, we hope this act
will influence them and suspect that they have the proper
sensitivity to carry it out.
Some emotion theory suggests that performing the act
associated with the emotion can create the experience of the
emotion: "By acting the part of one affected by a given emotion,
one can actually awaken some of the feeling characteristic of
it."'08 If holding our faces in a smiling position makes us feel
happier, 9 perhaps because the physiology suggests happiness
or because the cognitive associations with that position are
evoked through bodily memory, why not ask wrongdoers to
enact remorse. In so doing, wrongdoers may actually feel it,
and such remorse, more than shame, may work toward
deterrence.
Genuine remorse is, of course, better than remorse
simply acted and is one of the best possible outcomes of any
wrongdoer's punishment from the perspective of making us all
feel safer. According to Nicholas Tavuchis, apologies make us
feel safer. ° As symbolic expressions of genuine remorse, they
are "quintessentially social . . . a relational symbolic gesture
occurring in a complex interpersonal field, with enormous
reverberatory potential that encapsulates, recapitulates, and
pays homage to a moral order rendered problematic [and
unsafe] by the very act that calls it forth." 1 Thus, where
degradation and humiliation-external shaming-fail to
achieve their desired ends, apology may better approximate
self-produced shame and its ascendant social benefits.
108 David Pugmire, Real Emotion, 54 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 105,
115 (1994).
109 J. D. Laird, Self-attribution of Emotion: The Effects of Expressive Behavior
on the Quality of Emotional Experience, 29 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 475 (1974).
110 NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA 14 (1991).
"' Id. See Mea Culpa for an excellent discussion of the function of apology.
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I have argued in this Article that feeling safe and secure
is dependent on a variety of factors, some of which are
independent of the law. When we are allowed to express our
most aggressive feelings through the law, however
symbolically, the risk "of disproportionate punishments" is that
much higher,112 and we never deal with the fear within. Thus,
the fear within remains a hidden, yet motivating force and we
make others symbolically express that fear for us through
experiencing our condemnation and punishment. Naturally we
try to deal with our fears through aggression against those who
mean us harm; but the restraint of the aggressive impulse, and
the opportunity to witness symbolically the remorse of
wrongdoers, addresses our fears and creates a counteractive
feeling of safety.
Currently, the law allows us to address our fear through
the pleasure of retribution. Psychoanalytic theory, however,
suggests that such pleasure has its costs. It raises other fears,
like the fear of our own impulses--our inability to contain our
aggression. When we allow for apology, and when courtrooms
give room for remorse, above and beyond the blatantly coercive
space for remorse that now exists, we will have less need to see
wrongdoers as monsters, less need to turn our fear of our own
aggression into disproportional punishments of others who
have acted on their aggressive impulses or their own fears.
V. CONDEMNATION AS SYMBOLIC EXPRESSION
Condemnation through the law serves an important
expressive function for the culture in the way it reaffirms the
kinds of behavior we support and the kinds of behavior we
condemn. But it also functions on an individual level by giving
expression to the kind of person each of us feels we are, based
on the kinds of things we condemn as well as the ferocity of our
condemnation. On this individual level, condemnation
expresses our relationship to our own "bad" impulses, those
that urge us toward selfish and aggressive acts,"' as well as to
our fears concerning our frailty, our dependence on other
people and our smallness in relation to larger events and
institutions. In its social function, however, there is a burden to
insure that what the law expresses is consistent with larger
l' Massaro, supra note 5, at 99.
13 See Ehrenzweig, supra note 89.
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social goals and not merely an expression of individual
psychological motives, which are often, at heart, contradictory.
The urges to shame and wreak revenge, although deep-seated
emotions, are not unambiguously experienced or felt. To yoke
the law in any one case to only this defensive impulse does a
disservice not only to the legal system but also to those who
want revenge but are unaware of their more subtle and mixed
motives.
If the law is an expression of cultural values, values
that children, and all citizens hopefully, wish to obtain, it
cannot only condemn wrongdoers; the law must also provide
standards and moral ideals. Freud argued that the super ego,
that symbolic structure from which moral judgment arises, was
not only a restraining, condemning, harsh inner parental voice
but also the bearer of ego ideals without which the burden of
morality would be that much harder to bear."' Tom Tyley
wrote that the "law moralizes through good will. Individuals
are more disposed to obey particular laws, whether or not those
laws accord with their moral beliefs when they perceive the
criminal law as a whole to be basically just.""5 I suggest this
observation becomes even more accurate when they perceive
the law to be high minded, to elevate and to be more than
simply responsive to their baser impulses.
Condemnation through acts of shaming, exorbitant jury
awards and overly harsh sentencing, while it expresses and
satisfies our impulses to punish and seek revenge, does not
address the ideals of our society very well. Instead, in getting
revenge or meting out a severe punishment, we may feel
satisfied and superior to the offender who is made to suffer, but
that superiority comes from a denial of those impulses in
ourselves, a projection of those impulses onto the other, an
other that we create as a monster and thus as little like us as
possible.
Is condemnation then always suspect? Will we always
be able to ask of those who condemn, have you looked at
yourself too? Is there any act that deserves our total and most
unambivalent condemnation? There may be acts that deserve
the full strength of our condemnation. Even so, we ought to
114 FREUD, supra note 28.
'1 TOM R. TYLEY, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 62 (1990) (quoted in Kahan,
Alternative Sanctions, supra note 4, at 604).
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fully examine the social costs of expressing that emotion as
fully as we can.
